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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. General Introduction
Automation is becoming ever more present in everyday life. Part of that emerging
prevalence involves humans working alongside these automated systems in professional
and personal life (Merrit & Ilgen, 2008). Automation can be defined as a machine or
system carrying out a task, either partially or fully, that a human could perform, partially
or fully (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). While automation is used in
manufacturing to perform tedious, repetitive tasks, it can also be used in more complex
tasks. For example, automated robots can perform precise surgical procedures on patients
(Manzey et al., 2011), or be sent into harm’s way in military operations (de Visser &
Parasuraman, 2011). While discussions about automation’s role in displacing the worker
have captured national attention of late (McClure, 2018), automation is not limited to the
confines of structured work environments.
Of special interest lately is the rise of highly automated driving. Highly automated
driving is available for public consumption through certain automotive companies, such
as Tesla, Nissan, and Audi. Automation levels in driving, as classified by the Society of
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Automotive Engineers, ranges from level 0 to level 5. Each increase in level represents
more automation in the driving process (Table 1) (SAE International, 2018). As
automation increases in complexity, such as in automated driving, the industries it can
impact increases as well. Automation in the automotive industry is one that demonstrates
a high consequence environment for proper automation use. The inclusion of automation
to enhance safety and efficiency extends beyond the automotive industry; the aviation
security industry is now using automation to assist X-ray operators in detecting hazardous
items.

Table 1
Defining Characteristics of Levels of Automation in Driving

Automation
Level
0
1
2
3
4
5

Characteristics
No Automation
Non-simultaneous adaptive cruise and lane keeping
Simultaneous adaptive cruise control AND lane keeping
Conditional driving automation (with human intervention)
Conditional driving automation (without human intervention)
Driverless automation

X-ray screening is standard in airport security procedures, such that operators can
check luggage quickly and accurately determine if there are any hazardous items present.
X-ray screening is a useful tool given that examining each piece of baggage by hand
would require considerably more time. Furthermore, the use of X-ray screening allows
operators to detect items that have been hidden. Maintaining security for air travel
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remains a priority for airlines and governmental agencies, such as the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA). To ensure accuracy and to decrease wait time for
passengers, TSA has implemented diagnostic aids (DAs). These aids are capable of
automatically detecting explosive devices (Hättenschwiler, Sterchi, Mendes, &
Schwaninger, 2018) and firearms (Mery, Mondragon, Riffo, &Zuccar, 2013). DAs can
then render a warning in the form of an alert to the operator that a hazardous item is
present. The operator must still visually search the screen to ensure the alert is a true hit
and not a false alarm or is in fact a ‘correct rejection’ rather than a miss (Hättenschwiler
et al., 2018). In the current study’s X-ray task framework, a hit was searching when a
hazardous item was present, while a false alarm was searching when there was no
hazardous item present. A correct rejection entailed clearing a bag with no hazardous
items, and a miss occurred when a participant cleared a bag when a hazardous item was
present.

3

Figure 1. This image presents the stimuli of the baggage (center) and the
diagnostic aid (left). The diagnostic aid’s recommendation is given, and the
operator must make the choice to search or clear the baggage. Images from
Merritt, Shirase, and Foster (2019). Adapted with permission.

X-ray screening tasks with a DA have been used frequently as a research
paradigm (e.g., Chavaillaz, Schwaninger, Michel, & Sauer, 2019; Hättenschwiler et al.,
2018; Merritt, Heimbaugh, LaChapell, & Lee, 2013; Merritt, Lee, Unnerstall, & Huber,
2015). As a research paradigm it is invaluable as it allows for investigation into multiple
areas of human-automation interaction, such as stages of automation, human error, and
individual differences. The stages of automation, as proposed by Parasuraman, Sheridan,
and Wickens (2000), and adapted from the Human Information Processing model,
include four distinct stages of information processing: information acquisition,
information analysis, decision making, and action implementation. The use of X-ray
screening allows for investigation into how the automation of these stages increases or
decreases operator performance, especially in the information acquisition and analysis
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stages. Specifically, the DA is acquiring the information and analyzing that information
to provide a recommendation. It does not make a decision nor execute the final action of
searching the baggage. There is also potential to reveal human error through overreliance
on the automation. If a DA misses a hazardous item, and the operator relies on the
system’s appraisal, without ensuring its validity, there could be dangerous consequences.
This is a very real possibility, as the TSA has not properly maintained X-ray equipment
in the past (Office of Inspector General, 2015). Individual differences, such as trust in
automation or working memory capacity (WMC), amongst human operators could lead
some to be more prone to errors of commission than others. The error of commission here
is allowing the hazardous item to pass through. If a human operator were to miss a
hazardous item, especially due to divided attention between the primary task of
monitoring the DA and various secondary tasks (such as screening the baggage or having
conversations with other agents), this would be considered inattentional blindness (IB)
(Mack & Rock, 1998). The question remains, however, as to what the influences of trust
in automation and users’ WMC are on becoming inattentionally blind when completing
an X-ray screening procedure with a DA.

B. Inattentional Blindness
When attention is divided, events or objects can pass through the visual field
without being noticed. This failure to perceive unexpected but salient stimuli is referred
to as inattentional blindness because the stimulus is being seen but is not given adequate
attentional resources to be perceived (Mack & Rock, 1998). IB is based on the principle
that attention is closely related to working memory, which falls under the umbrella of
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perceptual load theory; perceptual load theory is founded upon the idea of limited
attentional resources (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). Individuals have a
limited amount of attention but can control how they allocate that attention. Attention can
even be divided between stimuli, but usually at the cost of performance. People usually
choose to selectively focus on one task, which results in better performance on that task
(Hyman, 2016). One can choose what to attend to and what to ignore. When one splits
attention between two tasks or events, there is possibility of inattentional blindness, such
that they fail to perceive even important or salient events and objects.
IB has been studied for decades. The foundational research on IB was conducted
using selective-looking tasks to determine what participants choose to attend to when
presented with dynamic stimuli. Neisser (1979) used this approach to determine how
participants processed dynamic events in their visual field. This study required
participants to watch a video of two groups of people passing a basketball. One group
wore white, while the other wore black. Participants in the experimental condition were
instructed to count the number of times one group passed the basketball to each other.
Other participants simply viewed the video. During the video, a woman holding an
umbrella walked through the two groups passing the basketballs
While this was an unexpected event, it was still completely in the participants’
view. Only 21% of participants reported seeing the woman with the umbrella. According
to Neisser (1979), these participants became selectively focused on the task and failed to
notice the event in their visual field. Although the phrase “inattentional blindness” was
coined by Mack and Rock (1998), Neisser’s (1979) selective-looking tasks demonstrated
the effects of IB on memory for events. Neisser’s (1979) study effectively demonstrated
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that when attentional resources are allocated to a task, such as counting basketball passes,
salient events can go unnoticed. If an operator is allocating attentional resources to
another task and becomes complacent, errors in the system may go unnoticed.
The umbrella study was replicated and further manipulated by Simons and
Chabris (1999) in the well-known “invisible gorilla study.” This study utilized a similar
video to the previously discussed study, and featured basketball passes between two
groups of players, again wearing either white or black. The salient event in this study was
a person in a gorilla costume walking into the middle of the players passing the ball,
beating its chest, and walking out of frame. Participants were instructed to count the
basketball passes made by one team or the other. Their findings mirrored the results from
Neisser’s (1979) umbrella study. Simons and Chabris’ (1999) study manipulated the
similarity of the unusual event to the task participants were attending, such that the black
gorilla was visually dissimilar to the white shirts of the players. The study showed that
participants making a cognitive effort to count the passes did not notice the “invisible
gorilla” because their attentional resources were depleted by the counting task.
Participants, when viewing the video again without counting, noticed the gorilla, further
demonstrating the participants’ previous IB. The task of counting required the
participants to attend to the players, such that they did not have the attentional resources
to attend to the gorilla event.
IB has been shown in multiple settings, but the literature on IB within automated
systems is scarce. Kennedy, Stephens, Williams, and Schutte (2014) investigated the
effects of levels of automation in a simulated flight on IB occurrence. They found that IB
was more likely when the flight was completely automated rather than partially

7

automated. Participants were instructed to monitor the automation for errors, but the
automation allowed participants to become complacent. There is a clear precedent for
high trust in automation to lead to automation complacency (Parasuraman & Manzey,
2010; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Ruscio, Ciceri, & Biassoni, 2015). This
logically leads to susceptibility to IB: as operators become complacent or are required to
divide attention between multiple tasks (analogous to counting the basketball passes
above), the opportunity for IB increases. This possibility could lead to hazardous
consequences if a threatening object were to pass through an X-ray screening task.
However, certain individual differences in operators, specifically trust in automation and
WMC, may attenuate the likelihood of IB.

C. Expected Relationships between WMC, Trust in Automation, and IB
This study seeks to establish a more comprehensive understanding about the
interactions between WMC, propensity to trust, trust in automation, automation
complacency, and IB. Previous research has led this author to posit that trust in
automation, which has been shown to be negatively correlated with WMC (Rovira, Pak,
& McLaughlin, 2018), leads operators to automation complacency, or the passive
monitoring of an automated system (Parasuraman et al., 1993; Ruscio et al., 2015). Once
operators become complacent, the likelihood to become inattentionally blind is dependent
upon WMC; situational awareness is higher in high WMC operators using automated
technology (Jipp & Ackerman, 2016). WMC may affect IB directly or through trust in
automation which leads to automation complacency. Propensity to trust may moderate
the relationship between WMC and trust in automation. The combination of high trust in
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automation and low WMC will result in operators becoming susceptible to IB (Ruscio et
al., 2015; Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer, 2011). The previous research in humanautomation interaction, WMC, and IB show a clear trend for individual differences of
operators to influence susceptibility to IB (Cavillo & Jackson, 2014; Hannon & Richards,
2010; Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010; Richards, Hellgren, & French, 2014;
Seegmiller et al., 2011). This study will specifically investigate how the combination of
higher trust, automation complacency, and lower WMC influences IB.

D. Automation Complacency Positive and Negative Feedback Loops
Parasuraman and Manzey’s (2010) model of complacency and automation bias
posits that when automation functions without failure, the operator’s complacency
potential increases. This would then lead to the operator becoming more complacent and
continuing the cycle, resulting in a positive feedback loop. This is referred to as “Learned
Carelessness” (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010, pg. 404-405). This occurs due to the lack
of performance consequences because the automation is functioning normally. However,
the model states that when the automation is not functioning reliably, the operator’s
complacency potential is lowered due to the performance consequences of errors of
commission or omission. In this framework, the performance consequences would cause
the operator to remain more vigilant when monitoring the automation. However, this may
not be applicable in a task in which the performance consequences are not salient to the
operator.
In the present study’s experimental framework, the operator must decide whether
a bag contains a hazardous item or not. If an operator makes an error of omission by
allowing a hazardous item to pass through security procedures, due to an unreliable DA,
9

the consequences are not immediately apparent to the operator. Therefore, the
performance consequences are not impactful on the operators’ potential to become
complacent when monitoring the automation. Rather, the noticing of these errors may be
more impactful in continuing these feedback loops of automation complacency proposed
by Parasuraman and Manzey (2010). If an operator notices the errors made by the DA,
either through a visual search or through the automation verification, then the operator
will be more likely to remain vigilant in future trials, decreasing the likelihood for
automation complacency to occur (Kraus et al., 2019). When an unreliable DA goes
unnoticed, perhaps due to insufficient attentional capacity (Jipp & Ackerman, 2016) or
high task load (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010), the operator will continue to monitor the
system as if it was functioning normally.

E. WMC Influences IB Directly
WMC may influence IB regardless of trust in automation. In IB research, WMC
has been studied as an individual difference that can predict whether certain individuals
are more likely to become inattentionally blind. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed that
working memory not only stores short-term information but could also manipulate that
information. The working memory model also features the central executive, which is
responsible for the allocation of attentional resources. WMC can be defined as one’s
capacity for attentional resources as well as executive control functioning to allocate
one’s attentional resources (Engle, 2001). Individuals with higher WMC can focus their
attention more effectively than low WMC individuals (Conway & Engle, 1994), but have
also been shown to have better reading comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980)
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and to perform better at detecting inconsistencies within sentences (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1983). Teams in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) supervision task also
performed better, even with a high cognitive load, when the overall team working
memory was high (McKendrick et al., 2014). Although high WMC operators may still
become complacent, they will still notice unexpected events and irregularities, such as
errors, in the automation (Jipp & Ackerman, 2016). With their high amount of attentional
resources, these operators would be less prone to IB because their ability to notice errors
in the system would be higher than those with lower WMC.
The literature on the influence of individuals’ WMC on the likelihood of
becoming inattentionally blind is substantial. Several studies have found that WMC can
predict IB to some degree (Cavillo & Jackson, 2014; Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards
et al., 2010; Richards et al., 2014; Seegmiller et al., 2011). Such studies focusing on
WMC and IB often focus on whether the individual difference predicting IB is indeed
WMC or a related target-specific subset of working memory, such as visual working
memory. Hannon and Richards (2010) examined these related aspects of memory through
computer-based perception tasks. Participants in the study completed the Operation Span
task (OSPAN), the Visual Working Memory (VWM) task, and the IB task. The OSPAN
consists of completing arithmetic problems while memorizing letters (Turner & Engle,
1989), while the VWM task requires participants to find differences in two displays of
colored squares. Finally, in the IB task, participants track white Ls and Ts, while ignoring
the black ones. They count how many times the white letters hit the edge of the screen,
and at some point a red cross appears on the screen. Participants are later asked if they
noticed any other symbols on the screen. They found that 50% of participants were blind
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to the red cross, but visual working memory was not a contributor to the noticing rates;
however, individual differences in WMC did contribute to differences in noticing rates.
These findings show that those higher in WMC have more attentional resources to notice
an unexpected stimulus, such as the red cross.
Other studies continued to find similar results related to WMC and IB. Seegmiller
and colleagues (2011) used the “invisible gorilla” stimulus from Simons and Chabris’
(1999) IB study and also measured WMC using the OSPAN (Turner & Engle, 1989).
They found that 58% of all participants were inattentionally blind to the gorilla; however,
they also found that WMC differences led to participants’ susceptibility to not notice,
such that higher WMC individuals noticed the gorilla more often (67%) than low WMC
individuals (36%). This is a key finding to support the notion of WMC affecting IB.
Using a classic IB stimulus and a psychometrically valid measure of WMC, a link was
found between the two constructs in this study. This finding alone supports the notion
that WMC can affect IB, and combined with previously discussed research, provides
substantial evidence that a link does exist between individual differences, such as WMC,
and IB.

F. Working Memory Capacity Influences Trust in Automation
Individual differences have been shown to influence IB, specifically in WMC
research. Hence, it is expected that WMC may directly influence IB. However, it was
also expected for WMC to influence IB through trust in automation. While there is
considerably less research on this relationship, it has been previously demonstrated.
Rovira and colleagues (2018) examined the relationship between WMC and automation
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reliability on performance in an automated task. They found that performance decreased
when the automation was incorrect more often. However, this effect was worsened for
participants with lower WMC. Moreover, the researchers found a significant negative
relationship between WMC and trust in automation. Lower WMC operators of automated
technology may choose to blindly trust the system, as they do not have the attentional
capacity to monitor it effectively. The link between WMC and trust in automation
supports the expectation that those who are lower in WMC are more likely to have higher
trust in automation, resulting in unfavorable automation effects, which could extend to
IB.
The link between WMC and trust in automation may be moderated by propensity
to trust automation, or the natural tendency to trust or distrust automated technology
(Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Participants with lower WMC may not trust highly in the system
if they already have a lower propensity to trust automation. Consequently, those with
lower WMC and high propensity to trust would be more likely to trust highly in the
system and become complacent. Thus, any study seeking to evaluate the relationship
between WMC and trust in automation should evaluate an individual’s propensity to
trust, even before using the automated system.

G. Trust in Automation Leads to Automation Complacency
Operators may have varying levels of trust in the machine they are working
beside. Differences in trust can affect the level of interaction between the user and the
machine. The level of trust one has with the machine is, in part, dependent on the
system’s reliability. The trust one has in the system leads to the use (or misuse/disuse) of
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the system (Muir, 1994; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). Trust can be lost with
malfunctions of the machine or system, which, in turn, reduces the operator’s reliance on
the system (Kraus, Scholz, Stiegemeier, & Baumann, 2019). However, understanding of
the machine’s capability and limitations over time calibrates the level of trust the operator
has (Muir, 1987). Human errors can, however, arise when there is a miscalibration of the
user’s trust in the machine, and the machine’s reliability.
Prolonged use of automated systems can lead to an operator becoming
complacent. Automation complacency, in which operators begin to passively monitor the
system, was first demonstrated by Parasuraman and colleagues (1993). The researchers
manipulated reliability of an automated system which detected faulty system performance
to either be consistent or variable. Participants were instructed to monitor the system,
while also performing secondary tasks. Results indicated that participants’ performance
on detecting system malfunctions decreased in the consistently reliable condition after 20
minutes. This demonstrates that when the system reliably performed the task, participants
became complacent and did not monitor effectively. This finding of complacency was not
found in the condition when participants only had the one task of monitoring, indicating
that workload and system reliability interact to lead to complacency (Parasuraman et al.,
1993). In addition, reliable systems lead to higher trust, which has also been shown to
lead to automation complacency (Ruscio et al., 2015). This complacency could result in
participants failing to monitor the primary task completely. However, complacency could
also be demonstrated in the failure to notice changes or errors in the system.
Complacency results in a lack of noticing, as participants are not monitoring the
system effectively (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). When combined with a lack of
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attentional resources available to process unexpected stimuli, IB can occur more
frequently (Hyman, 2016). Limited mental resources, in general, are widely studied and
modeled in automation research, such as the mental resource model. This model, in
particular, predicts how mental resources available to an operator will contribute to a
cognitive overload when multitasking (Wickens, 1980, 1984). Operators with lower
available attentional resources will not be able to effectively process a stimulus, and thus
may succumb to failures of awareness.
Furthermore, those using an automated DA may be susceptible to automation
bias, which is when operators rely on a decision-making aid while ignoring other
information; humans tend to favor decisions made by an automated system, rather than
search for evidence that would lead to a disconfirming decision (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, &
Burdock, 1998). This is especially true in time sensitive tasks, wherein temporal
pressures force operators to make decisions quickly and move forward with the decision.
This lends itself to an X-ray paradigm because DAs, while not fully making the decision
of clearing a piece of luggage or tagging it for a full search, give an indication to the
operator. The operator may choose to rely on these detection indicators, thereby
demonstrating automation bias by not actively searching for evidence (i.e., visually
searching the luggage screen). Automation bias has traditionally been viewed as a
decision-making bias, but it has been shown to also be due to limited attentional
resources (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Lower WMC operators of X-ray screening
technology may then be more susceptible to automation bias.
Operators with high trust in an automated system may begin to over-rely on the
system. According to Parasuraman and Riley (1997), over-relying on automation, or
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automation misuse, can lead to operator errors or incorrect decision making. Overreliance could result from operators who have prolonged use of automated systems and
have begun to have too much trust in the system that they fail to accurately monitor it and
remain vigilant. One study by Chavaillaz and colleagues (2019) examined expertise level,
among other factors, in a simulated X-ray screening task. The researchers found that
experts agreed more often with the DA than novices, complying with the system when it
found a target, and relying on the system to be accurate when it reported no targets found.
According to Chavaillaz and colleagues (2019), the experts may have only used the DA
to confirm their own decisions, but these results could also be explained by the experts
relying on the DA more than the novices. However, it should be noted that there were no
performance differences in the task when experts used the DA as compared to when they
had not. Novices did exhibit better performance when using the DA. It could still be
argued that experts in this study began to become complacent due to their prolonged use
of DAs.

H. Measuring Automation-Induced Complacency
Automation complacency can be difficult to measure behaviorally because the
phenomenon requires participants to commit errors while monitoring automation.
Naturally, one method of measuring if participants have become complacent is
performance on the primary task (Parasuraman et al., 1993). When performance
decrements occur, automation complacency could be a possible cause. However, the true
cause can be difficult to identify. A better method of measuring this phenomenon is with
automation verification, wherein participants are able to request more information from
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the automated system to determine if the system is reliably completing the task.
Parasuraman, de Visser, Lin, and Greenwood (2012) used automation verification in their
automated command and control task. Participants were instructed to navigate different
types of friendly units to engage with enemy units on a virtual battle map. Participants
completed the task under criteria for engagement based on distances between friendly and
enemy units as well as between enemy units and the headquarters located on the map.
Certain units, such as artillery units, were required to be within a certain distance to
engage with enemy units. The automation provided recommendations for the best
decision based on these distance criteria. Participants could choose to request more
information from the automation by clicking a button on the interface. The automation
would then provide the distances between units. The participant would be able to
determine if the automation’s recommendation was truly the best option. This feature
served as the measure of automation verification, and a similar method was used in the
present study.
Automation verification behaviors can be conceptualized as the opposite of
automation complacency behavior. Higher automation verification indicates the
participant was not complacent when completing the automated task. Participants who
choose to verify the automation are remaining vigilant and this behavior is associated
with fewer instances of automation complacency and errors of commission (Bahner,
Hüper, & Manzey, 2008). Participants who choose to rely on the automation and do not
verify the automation with additional information could be exhibiting signs of automation
complacency. Therefore, the present study will utilize this paradigm for measuring
automation complacency within an automated baggage screening system.
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CHAPTER II

METHOD

A. Participants
A convenience sample of participants (N = 70) was recruited from undergraduate
students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at The University of Alabama in
Huntsville. Participants were excluded (n = 3) if their performance scores were lower
than 2 SD from the mean. All participants were at least 18 years old. This study was
approved by The University of Alabama in Huntsville Institutional Review Board
(Appendix A) along with the consent form (Appendix B). Participant demographics are
reported in Table 2.
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Table 2
Participant Demographic Frequency and Percentages

Frequency

Percentage

Sex
Male
Female
Prefer not to answer
Ethnicity
Caucasian
African American
Asian
Multiple Races
Other
College Classification
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Other (Second Bachelor’s)

23
46
1

32.86%
65.71%
1.43%

43
7
2
7
10

62.32%
10.14%
2.90%
10.14%
14.49%

31
25
10
3
1

44.29%
35.71%
14.29%
4.29%
1.43%

B. Materials
Propensity to trust in automation was measured before the X-Ray task through the
Automation-Induced Complacency Potential-Revised scale (AICP-R; Merritt, Ako-Brew,
et al., 2019). The AICP-R has demonstrated internal consistency with Cronbach’s α = .84
and α = .77 for its two factors of Alleviating Workload and Monitoring, respectively.
This scale included 10 items on a 5-point Likert scale, such as “When I have a lot to do, it
makes sense to delegate a task to automation” (Appendix C). Trust in automation was
measured using the Trust of Automated Systems Test (TOAST; Wojton, Porter, Lane,
Bieber, & Madhavan, 2019). TOAST’s two factors, Understanding and Performance,
have demonstrated concurrent validity with trust, r = .56 and r = .72, respectively.
Furthermore, internal validity ranges from Cronbach’s α = .74 to α = .84 for the
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Understanding subscale and from Cronbach’s α = .83 to α = .84 for the Performance
Subscale, indicating items are measuring the same construct by producing similar scores.
TOAST is a 9-item measure consisting of statements such as “I understand what the
system should do.” Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale. TOAST was
administered immediately following the task to determine system dependent trust. To
measure WMC, the Listening Span Task (LST) was used (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991).
The LST consisted of a verbal presentation of simple sentences by a pre-recorded female
voice, while the participant memorized the last word of the sentence(s) and answered
comprehensive questions about the sentence(s). Once the number of sentences in that
section was complete, the participants wrote down the memorized words on an answer
sheet. There were three trials in each of the seven sections of the LST, wherein each new
section added another sentence to each trial. This resulted in a total of seven sentences in
each trial in the last section. An X-ray screening task was made, adapted from images in
an X-ray research database (Figure 1; Merritt, Shirase, et al., 2019). MATLAB was used
to present the task. The X-ray screening task collected measures of performance as well
as the vigilance score, or the percentage of trials in which the participant verified the
automation. As can be seen in Figure 2, in one trial the baggage included a bomb to serve
as an IB stimuli. A demographics questionnaire was also used, including questions about
sex, ethnicity, and other demographic information.
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Figure 2. This image represents trial 80, wherein a bomb was superimposed on
the image to serve as an IB stimulus. No other hazardous items are present.
Original image from Merritt, Shirase, and colleagues (2019). Adapted with
permission.

C. Procedure
Upon arrival to the experimental session, participants presented identification to
the experimenter to ensure they were at least 18 years of age. Participants first read and
signed an informed voluntary consent form. The experimenter answered any questions
and explained the procedure of the experiment. Participants began the experiment by
completing the AICP-R which took approximately 5 min. Then participants completed
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the LST. This took approximately 20-25 min to complete. Participants then began the XRay task on a computer. Participants were instructed to visually scan the baggage on
screen to determine if there were any hazardous items present. If a hazardous item was
present, participants were instructed to click the “Search” button, whereas baggage with
no hazardous items should have received the “Clear” button (Figure 1). Participants
completed 160 trials of the X-ray task, wherein 32 semi-random trials featured an
erroneous recommendation from the DA. The erroneous DA trials were implemented
such that the first 15 trials featured a correct recommendation and no two trials featured
an erroneous recommendation consecutively. This ensured participants could calibrate
their trust in the system and regarded it as a reliable system. The 32 erroneous
recommendation trials resulted in an automation reliability of 80%. This value has been
used to represent imperfect automation in the literature (Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005).
Imperfect automation can still induce automation complacency (Wickens, Clegg, Vieane,
& Sebok, 2015). The remaining trials included a correct DA indicator of “Search” or
“Clear”. The X-ray task took 20-30 min to complete. Participants were instructed to
complete the trials as quickly as possible, to represent the temporal pressures on real Xray screening agents. Simultaneously participants were instructed to count the number of
orange-colored objects in the display. This counting task served as a secondary task, and
after every 10 trials participants reported the number of orange-coded objects they had
seen. This task, which was measured for accuracy, remains ecologically valid as TSA
agents use the colored display to detect organic materials, which are colored orange. In
the IB stimulus trial, if participants decided to clear that baggage it was regarded as an
instance of IB, considering there were no other hazardous items present in the baggage.
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Once finished with the X-Ray task, participants completed the TOAST, which took
approximately 5 min to complete. Finally, participants completed the demographics form.
Participants were debriefed, the experimenter answered any questions from the
participants, and then released them. The entire study took approximately 1hr to
complete.
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CHAPTER III

STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS

A. Descriptive Statistics and Frequencies
Descriptive statistics are included for all variables in Table 3. Vigilance
frequencies indicated that all except n = 2 participants utilized the automation
verification button. IB frequencies showed that n = 35 (58.33%) missed the IB stimulus
and n = 25 (41.67%) noticed the stimulus. A Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test was
conducted to test the difference between these frequencies, which was not significant,
χ2(1, N = 60) = 1.667, p = .197. All statistical analyses were conducted at α = .05.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Variable
WMC
Propensity to Trust
Trust in Automation
Vigilance Score

M
54.94
3.06
4.92
24.29%

SD
10.40
0.53
1.07
30.92%

Note. WMC scored out of 81. Propensity to Trust scored out of 5. Trust in Automation
scored out of 7. Vigilance Score scored out of 100%.
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B. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of WMC and Trust in Automation onto IB
A Binary Logistic Regression was conducted to determine the influence of both
WMC and trust in automation on the likelihood of not noticing the IB event. WMC and
trust in automation were treated as continuous variables, while IB was analyzed as a
binary variable of noticing or not noticing the stimulus. As can be seen in Table 4, neither
WMC, B = .018, SE = .026, p = .492, nor trust in automation, B = .149, SE = .253,
p = .555, were found to be significant predictors when regressed onto IB.

Table 4
Logistic Regression Analysis Results of WMC and Trust in Automation onto IB

Predictor
Intercept
WMC
Trust in Automation

IB
B
-1.339
.018
.149

SE
1.831
.026
.253

Note. WMC = Working Memory Capacity. B = unstandardized beta. SE = standard error.

C. WMC and Trust in Automation Analyses
Pearson’s correlation was conducted between continuous variables WMC and trust
in automation to determine an association. The correlation between the two variables was
not found to be significant, r(65) = .056, p = .659. Due to this unexpected finding, a
follow up independent t-test was conducted to determine if participants with high or low
WMC scores reported different levels of trust in automation. To accomplish this, a
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median split was conducted on WMC, such that any score above Mdn = 55 was analyzed
as a high WMC and any at or below were analyzed as low WMC. An independent
samples t-test revealed no significant differences in trust in automation between
participants with high (M = 5.02) or low (M = 4.81) WMC, t(60) = -7.50, p = .456. To
further verify there were no differences in trust in automation between high and low
WMC, a quartile split was also created to compare trust in automation between the first
(bottom 25%) and fourth (top 25%) quartiles of WMC scores. This was done by
analyzing any scores at or below 49 for the first quartile and any scores at or above 62 for
the fourth quartile. An independent samples t-test confirmed there were no significant
differences in trust in automation between the first (M = 4.66) and fourth (M = 4.81)
quartiles, t(29) = -.347, p = .731. These findings add to the lack of evidence of a
relationship between WMC and trust in automation. Due to the lack of supporting
evidence between WMC and trust in automation, it was decided not to test propensity to
trust as a moderating variable.

D. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of WMC and Trust in Automation onto
Vigilance
A multiple linear regression was conducted to determine if WMC and trust in
automation were suitable predictors of Vigilance Scores. The regression model was not
found to be significant, F(2,57) = .724, p = .489. Neither WMC, B = -.005, SE = .004,
p = .244, nor trust in automation, B = .014, SE = .040, p = .737 were found to be suitable
predictors of vigilance, or a lack of automation complacency. These results are presented
in Table 5.
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Table 5
Multiple Regression Analysis Results of WMC and Trust in Automation onto Vigilance

Predictor
Intercept
WMC
Trust in Automation

Vigilance Scores
B
.466
-.005
.014

SE
.296
.004
.040

Note. B = unstandardized beta. SE = standard error.

E. Performance and Monitoring Behavior Data
Performance was analyzed as the percent of trials in which the participant made
the correct decision to search or clear the baggage out of the total number of trials
completed by that participant. Participants’ performance on the primary task of searching
baggage that featured hazardous items and clearing baggage that contained no hazardous
items was analyzed through two conditions: trials in which the automation provided a
correct recommendation to search or clear and trials in which the automation provided an
incorrect recommendation. Analyzing these trials separately allows for a more precise
understanding of instances of agreement with the automation versus disagreement. Two
conditions of Performance were created to measure this: correct DA performance and
incorrect DA performance.
Participants made the correct decision (M = 88.81%; SD = 10.34%) more often
when the automation provided a correct recommendation than when the automation was
incorrect (M = 9.29%; SD = 9.86%). This difference was analyzed with a one-way
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repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). As presented in Figure 3, the ANOVA
showed a main effect for performance between the conditions, F(1, 61) = 1087.07, p
< .001, ηp2 = .947. Because of the within-subjects design for this analysis, confidence
intervals were calculated using a procedure using the within-subjects error variance,
which involves creating adjusted values for data points to maintain the mean but decrease
standard error (Loftus & Masson, 1994). A mixed ANOVA with performance (incorrect
DA, correct DA) as a within-subjects variable and WMC split (high, low) as a between
subjects variable determined that there was no interaction effect, F(1, 60) = .232, p
= .632. Additionally, a mixed ANOVA with performance (incorrect DA, correct DA) as a
within-subjects variable and trust in automation split (high, low) as a between subjects
variable determined that there was no interaction effect, F(1, 58) = .932, p = .338.
To measure performance on the distractor task, participants’ final count of orange
colored objects was aggregated and compared against the correct number of orange
colored items (N = 294). Participants average count was M = 321.97; SD =129.59 , such
that on average participants’ count was M = 22.94 from the true count, a difference of
7.80%. Participants’ difference between reported counts and the true count were analyzed
with an independent samples t-test to determine if high WMC participants were more
accurate than low WMC participants. The difference between reported counts and the
true count was not significantly different between low WMC (M = 36.54; SD = 139.46)
and high WMC participants (M = 12.11; SD = 116.71), t(60) = .733, p = .466.
Additionally, an independent samples t test was conducted to determine differences in
accuracy between those who experience IB and those who did not. The difference was
significant, t(58) = 2.508, p = .015, d = .59.
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Monitoring behavior was measured as vigilance scores, or the percent of trials in
which the participant requested more information from the automation out of the total
number of trials completed by that participant. Vigilance scores were separated into
correct DA trials and incorrect DA trials. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted to determine if vigilance was different between correct and incorrect DA trials.
As observed in Figure 4, the difference between correct DA trials (M = 25.29%;
SD = 32.79%) and incorrect DA trials (M = 29.86%; SD = 32.71%) was significant,
F(1,61) = 18.783, p < .001, ηp2 = .235. This indicates that participants, on average,
verified the automation more frequently when the automation provided an incorrect
recommendation. Because of the within-subjects design for this analysis, confidence
intervals were calculated using a procedure using the within-subjects error variance
(Loftus & Masson, 1994).
To test the positive and negative complacency feedback loops, a new variable,
subsequent vigilance, was created. This was created by examining participants’ vigilance
on the trials immediately following a trial in which the automation was incorrect.
Subsequent vigilance included two levels: vigilance after agreeing with the DA versus
vigilance after disagreeing with the DA. Subsequent vigilance after agreeing with the DA
was calculated as the frequency of trials in which a participant verified the automation
immediately after agreeing with an erroneous DA on the previous trial. For example, if a
participant completed a trial that featured an incorrect DA (wherein they agreed with the
incorrect DA), then they chose to request more information from the automation on the
next trial, that would be considered an instance of subsequent vigilance after agreeing.
Analyzing subsequent vigilance after disagreeing with the DA was conducted with the

29

same method but focused on whether the participant requested more information on the
trial immediately following a trial wherein the participant disagreed with an incorrect
DA. The average subsequent vigilance for both levels were compared through a one-way
repeated measure ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed no differences between subsequent
vigilance after agreeing with the incorrect DA (M =23.76%; SD = 30.98%) and
subsequent vigilance after disagreeing with the incorrect DA (M =19.69%;
SD = 33.60%), F(1,48) = .781, p = .381. This indicated that whether participants noticed
the system was unreliable on one trial did not affect participants’ decision to verify the
automation on the next trial.

Figure 3. This bar chart shows that performance was significantly worse when the
DA recommended an incorrect decision. Error bars indicate 95% within-subjects
confidence interval (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Figure 4. This bar chart shows that participants verified the automation more
frequently when the automation provided an incorrect recommendation. Error
bars indicate 95% within-subjects confidence interval (Loftus & Masson, 1994).

F. Performance and Monitoring Behavior in Non-IB Participants
Analyses were conducted in order to determine performance and
monitoring behavior in individuals who experienced did not experience IB; these
participants noticed the bomb and chose to search that trial. The analyses followed the
same procedures as those used for the total sample of IB and non-IB participants. First, a
one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on data from non-IB participants
only to determine if performance was different between correct and incorrect DA trials.
The difference between correct DA trials (M = 86.08%; SD = 9.75%) and incorrect DA
trials (M = 10.79%; SD = 9.98%) was significant, F(1,23) = 393.959, p < .001,
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ηp2 = .945. Next, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on data from
non-IB participants only to determine if vigilance was different between correct and
incorrect DA trials. The difference between correct DA trials (M = 20.67%;
SD = 25.28%) and incorrect DA trials (M = 26.39%; SD = 25.41%) was significant,
F(1,23) = 7.977, p = .01, ηp2 = .258. These analyses follow the same trend as the
analyses which included the total sample.

G. Participant Bias
Participant bias was measured to better understand how participants responded to
individual trials. This was calculated by examining how participants responded when
they made an incorrect decision and is represented by B”. B” ranges from -1.0 to 1.0,
with -1.0 representing bias towards searching and 1.0 representing bias towards clearing
the baggage. Of note, B” is not a measure of performance, but rather an indication of
what types of errors were made when errors were made. Said another way, a B” score of
1.0 means all errors made were towards clearing baggage which had a weapon in it. A B”
score of -1.0 means all errors made were towards searching baggage which had no
weapon. A B” score of 0 means that errors were evenly distributed, and scores in
between represent different strengths of bias. On average, B” was M = .20 with SD = .24,
indicating most participants were slightly biased towards clearing baggage. To determine
if B” was significantly different from no bias (B” = 0), a single sample t- test was
conducted, resulting in a significant difference, t(61) = 6.56, p < .001, d = .83.
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H. Additional Analyses
Further analyses were conducted to examine other relationships between the
variables of interest. These correlations included WMC and vigilance scores, trust in
automation and vigilance scores, and trust in automation and propensity to trust.
Pearson’s correlations for these variables resulted in no significant relationships between
WMC and vigilance scores, r(61) = -.149, p = .247, trust in automation and vigilance
scores, r(59) = .032, p = .806, and trust in automation and propensity to trust,
r(66) = .083, p = .506. Because the measure of propensity to trust (AICP-R) is subdivided
into two scales, Alleviating Workload and Monitoring, correlations between these
subscales and trust in automation were also conducted. The correlations were not
significant between the Alleviating Workload subscale and trust in automation, r(58) =
-.053, p = .687, nor between the Monitoring subscale and trust in automation, r(58) =
-.017, p = .900. Additionally, participants’ experience with automation was analyzed to
determine its effect on trust in automation. An independent samples t-test was conducted
which resulted in no significant effects between average trust in participants who reported
having previous experience with automation (M = 4.84) and those who reported having
no previous experience (M = 4.97), t(67) = .492, p = .624.
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

A. General Summary of Findings
The primary objective of this study was to determine the influence of WMC and
trust in automation on the likelihood of noticing an IB stimulus. Other objectives
included investigating relationships between WMC, trust in automation, performance,
and vigilance. It was expected that WMC would negatively influence IB occurrence and
trust in automation would positively influence IB occurrence. While participants seemed
to miss the IB event, neither WMC nor trust in automation accurately predicted IB
occurrence. It was hypothesized that WMC would be negatively associated with trust in
automation; however, WMC and trust in automation were not found to be significantly
correlated. It was expected that WMC would positively influence vigilance scores and
trust in automation would negatively influence vigilance scores, but neither WMC nor
trust in automation appeared to influence vigilance behaviors. Trust in automation was
not found to be correlated with propensity to trust either. Performance results indicated
that participants agreed with the DA whether it provided a correct or incorrect
recommendation. Combined with the finding that participants experienced IB, there
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are potentially dangerous implications for human-automation teaming, which will be
discussed in turn.

B. Performance and Monitoring Behavior
Results indicated that participants performed significantly better when the DA
provided a correct recommendation than when it provided an incorrect recommendation.
This is caused, at least in part, by the fact that participants agreed with the DA whether it
was correct or incorrect. This agreement can be viewed as automation bias, wherein
operators rely on a DA’s recommendation without searching for evidence to ensure it is
correct (Mosier et al., 1998). Because participants’ performance was much higher on
trials in which the DA was correct (M = 88.81%) than when the DA was incorrect (M =
9.29%), the participants seemed to rely on the automation being correct without searching
the baggage for hazardous items. The participants were unaware that the automation
would provide an incorrect recommendation 20% of the time and could have had
miscalibrated expectations of the system. These high expectations may be realistic of
actual operators as automation reliability is especially important in high consequence
situations, such as aviation security screening procedures. Operators may expect the
automation to be more reliable than it actually is.
Additionally, participants may have focused their attention on the secondary task,
such that they began to over rely on the automation to perform the primary task. That is
to say the participants expected the system to be reliable when it was not. Combined with
the finding that the average vigilance score was M = 24.29%, these results indicate that
participants failed to verify the automation and began to blindly trust in the DA’s
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recommendation (Parasuraman et al., 2012). According to Parasuraman and Manzey
(2010), automation bias and automation complacency are different representations of the
same phenomena. Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) argued that attention is the basis for
these human-automation phenomena to occur. However, if participants failed to attend to
the primary task, this was not due to WMC. The results of the present study show that all
participants, regardless of WMC, succumbed to automation bias. Trust in automation also
did not interact with performance, indicating that even those who reported lower trust
were susceptible to agreeing with DA.
The overall trend to agree with the DA is not a novel finding and has been
demonstrated in various domains and among experts of systems (Parasuraman et al.,
2012; Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010; Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007). The
key finding is that participants, regardless of WMC or trust in automation, were affected.
This implies that any operator is prone to human-automation biases, which have adverse
effects, such as over relying on unreliable automated DAs (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Over reliance can lead to errors of commission or omission when an operator agrees with
an incorrect DA. In the aviation security industry, errors of omission, such as allowing a
hazardous item onboard an airplane, can lead to dangerous situations. The likelihood of
automation bias occurring during a time sensitive task, such as quickly scanning images
of baggage for hazardous items, is increased by the temporal pressures (Cummings,
2004). In this study, the likelihood for automation bias may have been exacerbated by the
participants’ ignorance of the system capabilities, as participants did not receive training
other than instructions. This could have led some participants to over-rely on the system,
given their lack of understanding of the system’s capabilities (Muir, 1987). However,
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even proper training and instructions cannot prevent automation bias completely
(Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010). In short, the prevalence of automation bias is not an
unexpected finding, but it does have serious implications for operators of systems
utilizing a DA.
The finding that participants had higher vigilance scores on trials in which the
automation provided incorrect recommendations implies that participants may not have
been completely complacent. They may have begun to notice errors in the automation
and searched for more evidence to confirm or deny the automation’s recommendation.
However, when the DA recommended an incorrect decision, the information button did
not contradict the DA. By not contradicting itself, the automation appeared to be correct.
Participants may have encountered trials wherein the automation recommended clearing
the baggage, and so decided to use the information button. Upon requesting more
information, the automation would have informed the participant whether a knife or gun
was detected. Rather than visually search the baggage for the target, participants chose to
agree with the automation. Although vigilance scores were low overall, M = 24.29%, and
in line with rates found in previous literature (Parasuraman et al., 2012), the combination
of bias and complacency measures implies participants did notice the system’s errors but
agreed with the system anyway. This contradictory logic may imply participants were
unwilling to disagree with the automation simply because it was “computerized,” and
may have trusted in it more than their own ability to detect hazardous items (Mosier et
al., 1998). This finding indicates the complexities of human-machine teaming, such that
some individuals may be so prone to trust in their machine counterpart, they may
knowingly agree with an unreliable system. This finding highlights the risks of biases that
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must be assessed when implementing human-machine teaming, especially with an
automated DA.

C. Null findings of WMC, Trust in Automation, and IB
The finding that WMC did not influence IB indicates that individual differences
in attentional capacities may not be an appropriate explanation for noticing rates of
unexpected stimuli or events. The current finding that WMC does not influence IB has
replicated previous research findings (Kreitz, Furley, Simons, Memmert, 2015; Kreitz,
Furley, Simons, Memmert, 2016). Additionally, the lack of evidence in the present study
for WMC influencing IB may highlight issues for replication. Several studies have found
evidence that WMC may influence IB to a degree (Cavillo & Jackson, 2014; Hannon &
Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2010; Richards et al., 2014; Seegmiller et al., 2011). Each
of these studies used either the OSPAN (Turner & Engle, 1989) or AOSPAN (Automated
Operation Span) (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). While these tasks are
widely used to measure generalized WMC, if WMC does influence IB then the previous
findings should be replicated through other tasks also measuring generalized WMC.
More specifically, domain-specific capacities, such as visual working memory capacity,
have been found not to influence IB, while generalized WMC has been found to
influence IB (Hannon & Richards, 2010). While this study is the first to use the LST
(Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) to predict IB, both the LST and OSPAN tasks are complex
span tasks used to measure generalized WMC. Complex span tasks require both a
processing and memory task. In the LST, the processing task is reading comprehension
and the memory task is to memorize words. The AOSPAN uses mathematical problems
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for the processing task and letters for the memory task. Furthermore, the LST and
OSPAN are significantly related to one another, r = .55, indicating they produce similar
scores (Shelton, Elliott, Hill, Calamia, & Gouvier, 2009). Although significantly
correlated, there may be other constructs being measured through these tasks as well,
considering the correlation between these two measures is not higher (which is to be
expected for two measures of the same construct). Nevertheless, the findings of studies
utilizing OSPAN and AOSPAN may only be replicable by studies using those
measurement methodologies. With the failure to replicate these studies’ findings using a
similar method for measuring WMC, a question is posed of whether WMC is truly
influencing IB or if another mechanism influences noticing rates. Or, perhaps, WMC is
not a single construct given that a supposedly valid measure of WMC used here (LST)
was not replicating findings which have been established before using other validated
measures.
If cognitive differences in WMC do not influence IB, then another explanation is
needed on why some participants noticed the IB stimulus and others did not. Differences
in rates of noticing may be influenced by characteristics of the primary task (Kreitz et al.,
2015; Kreitz et al., 2016). The IB stimulus used in this study, a bomb, was salient enough
to be noticed by 41.67% of participants but remained unexpected as participants were
expecting guns and knives. Another explanation as to why 58.33% of participants failed
to search the baggage which featured the bomb is that the stimulus was not in the
participants’ attentional set. Attentional set refers to the stimuli we expect to see in
specific contexts (Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005). For example, drivers often
fail to see motorcycles on the road because the attentional set for drivers includes more
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traditional vehicles (Pammer, Sabadas, & Lentern, 2018). In the present study’s X-ray
screening task, a bomb might fall out of participants’ attentional set for hazardous items
in baggage. This may have been exacerbated by the instructions given to participants to
“search for hazardous weapons (guns and knives)”. While a bomb is certainly a
hazardous weapon, the participants’ attentional set may have been influenced by this
methodological choice. This may indicate the need for future research without specific
instructions that may bias the participants’ expectations.
The finding that participants failed to notice the IB stimulus has replicated other
studies on IB and has replicated the finding of IB occurrence in automated tasks as well
(Kennedy et al., 2014). This finding promotes the importance of reliable automation and
frequent breaks to reduce fatigue. Participants, regardless of WMC or trust in automation,
experienced IB in a short (~25 min) task. This poses a danger to the aviation security
industry, wherein an IB occurrence could lead to life-threatening situations, such as a
hazardous item being allowed through security screening procedures. Designers of
automated systems with supervisory control must account for failures of perception such
as inattentional blindness or change blindness, the inability to notice a change in stimuli,
by implementing fail safes and reliable automation. These findings suggest that anyone,
regardless of these individual differences, may be susceptible to experiencing IB.
This study’s findings show a lack of evidence for WMC to influence trust in
automation, which is surprising. Previous research has shown WMC and trust in
automation to have an inverse relationship, such that those with higher WMC tend to
trust in automation less (Rovira et al., 2018). According to Wojton, Porter, Lane, Bieber,
and Madhavan (2019) other studies primarily use author-written scales which are based
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on constructs similar to trust, such as reliance on a system. Other researchers have also
emphasized the need for the human-automation interaction field to more accurately
measure trust (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). These previous measures of trust have not been
psychometrically validated, and thus the field should be cautioned against placing too
much weight into such measures. To this author’s knowledge the present study is among
the first to use a psychometrically valid measure of trust in automated systems.
Psychometrically valid scales and measures are rigorously developed and statistically
tested to ensure the scale is actually measuring the target construct and not a related
construct. By using a standardized, psychometrically validated measure of trust (TOAST;
Wojton et al., 2019), trust in automation is accurately measured and its relationship with
WMC can be determined. In addition, any measure which attempts to establish individual
differences (as is done with correlations, for example) needs to have suitably high testretest reliability, which the TOAST has exhibited. Trust in automation may be more
complex of a construct than has been treated in previous literature. However, this does
not invalidate the findings of previous research. The TOAST uses two subscales,
Understanding and Performance, which may measure trust in a different perspective than
previous research methods have. More research is needed with both this measure and
previous measures to determine the efficacy of TOAST as a more accurate measure of
trust.

D. Limitations and Future Directions
This study attempted to utilize psychometrically valid measures to accurately
measure WMC and trust in automation and determine any influences of these variables
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on IB, vigilance, and performance, however, some limitations still exist. For one,
sampling issues are present in the current study. College-age students interacted with the
automated task for a short period of time, while true X-ray screeners work with the
automation for much longer periods of time and may be more motivated to pay greater
attention and perform the task well (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Furthermore, the
implementation of the verification button in the X-ray task may need adjustment for
future research. The average percentage of trials in which the participant verified the
automation was M = 24.29%, but SD = 30.92%, indicating high variability in
participants’ verification behavior. It may be the case that some participants did not fully
understand the use of the verification button or the button did not provide enough
information to be useful. The verification button provided information by telling the
participant whether it detected a gun or knife, specifically. This may not have provided
enough additional information to verify the automation. Future research may include a
verification button that displays a level of confidence provided by the automation or
provide more specific information to the participant, such as an indicator of the general
area of the hazardous item or target.
Additionally, the inclusion of the phrase “guns and knives” when instructing
participants to search for hazardous items may have limited participants’ expectations
and artificially increased the IB rates for the trial which featured a bomb. Some
participants may have noticed it but decided to clear the baggage because there was no
gun or knife present. Future research would benefit from providing less specific
information to the participant to prevent against biasing expectations.
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Future research should continue to use psychometrically valid forms of
measurement for trust in automation, such as TOAST. This will provide a clearer
comparison between findings and would allow for future studies’ findings to be more
easily replicable. IB should continue to be examined, especially in the context of
automation, as more questions have been raised by the results from this study. If WMC
nor trust in automation can predict IB in supervisory control tasks, there may be other
operator characteristics influencing noticing rates. The automated system may play the
largest role in the interaction of IB and automation, such as how reliable the system is or
how transparent it operates. Future research could focus on feedback to the operator when
IB or change blindness is possible. Adaptive automation, or automation that adapts to the
operator’s performance by monitoring live performance, should be implemented within
an X-ray screening task to determine its effectiveness in preventing performance
decrements or instances of IB (Parasuraman, Cosenze, & de Visser, 2009). The
combination of automation verification within the automated X-ray screening task
paradigm created a unique method for examining human-automation interaction and
should be utilized in the future and improved through data-driven adjustments, such as
with the verification button. In short, there are still many possible interactions within
automation and operator characteristics that must be investigated.

E. Conclusion
This study attempted to determine the influence of WMC and trust in automation
on IB occurrence. Simultaneously, this study explored interactions between WMC, trust
in automation, propensity to trust, vigilance behaviors, and performance on task. While
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neither WMC nor trust in automation were found to be suitable predictors of IB,
participants (58.33%) chose to clear a baggage which contained a superimposed image of
a bomb. Furthermore, participants’ performance on trials which featured inaccurate
automation indicate participants experienced automation bias. Complacency appeared to
occur in participants as well, as vigilance was low on average (M = 24.29%). These
findings together create a powerful impact, especially for the aviation security industry:
anyone is susceptible to IB, automation bias or automation complacency, regardless of
WMC or trust in automation. Proper procedures must be in place to prevent these
inadvertent consequences of human-automation teaming, such as frequent breaks to
combat fatigue when monitoring automated technology, and designers of automated
systems should account for the possibility of IB by implementing engineered solutions,
including fail safes within the automation. This study added to the literature by
identifying several variables that appear to not impact IB and by replicating IB
occurrence within an automated system. This study is also among the first to use a
psychometrically valid measurement for trust in automated systems, which resulted in
several null results for relationships between variables which have been found in previous
literature. The null results in this study have impact in their contradictions with previous
research and further research must be carried out to examine and resolve these
discrepancies. In short, operators of automated technology must remain vigilant when
completing tasks or may fall prey to a host of human-automation related phenomena,
such as IB, automation bias, or automation complacency.
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APPENDIX A
Institutional Review Board Approval Form
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APPENDIX B
Consent Form
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APPENDIX C
Questionnaire
Automation-Induced Complacency Potential-Revised Scale (AICP-R) (Merritt,
Ako-Brew, et al., 2019)
5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)
1. When I have a lot to do, it makes sense to delegate a task to automation.
2. If life were busy, I would let an automated system handle some tasks for me.
3. Automation should be used to ease people’s workload.
4. If automation is available to help me with something, it makes sense for me to
pay more attention to my other tasks.
5. Even if an automated aid can help me with a task, I should pay attention to its
performance.
6. Distractions and interruptions are less of a problem for me when I have an
automated system to cover some of the work.
7. Constantly monitoring an automated system’s performance is a waste of time.
8. Even when I have a lot to do, I am likely to watch automation carefully for
errors.
9. It’s not usually necessary to pay much attention to automation when it is
running.
10. Carefully watching automation takes time away from more important or
interesting things.
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